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In early 1976, the novel A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1)
influenza virus caused severe respiratory illness in 13 sol-
diers with 1 death at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Since A/New
Jersey was similar to the 1918–1919 pandemic virus, rapid
outbreak assessment and enhanced surveillance were ini-
tiated. A/New Jersey virus was detected only from January
19 to February 9 and did not spread beyond Fort Dix.
A/Victoria/75 (H3N2) spread simultaneously, also caused
illness, and persisted until March. Up to 230 soldiers were
infected with the A/New Jersey virus. Rapid recognition of
A/New Jersey, swift outbreak assessment, and enhanced
surveillance resulted from excellent collaboration between
Fort Dix, New Jersey Department of Health, Walter Reed
Army Institute of Research, and Center for Disease Control
personnel. Despite efforts to define the events at Fort Dix,
many questions remain unanswered, including the follow-
ing: Where did A/New Jersey come from? Why did trans-
mission stop? 
R
evisiting events surrounding the 1976 swine influ-
enzaA(H1N1) outbreak may assist those planning for
the rapid identification and characterization of threatening
contemporary viruses, like avian influenza A (H5N1) (1).
The severity of the 1918 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic
and evidence for a cycle of pandemics aroused concern
that the 1918 disaster could recur (2,3). Following the
1918 pandemic, H1N1 strains circulated until the “Asian”
influenza A (H2N2) pandemic in 1957 (3). When in early
1976, cases of influenza in soldiers, mostly recruits, at Fort
Dix, New Jersey, were associated with isolation of influen-
za A (H1N1) serotypes (which in 1976 were labeled
Hsw1N1), an intense investigation followed (4). 
Of 19,000 people at Fort Dix in January 1976, ≈32%
were recruits (basic trainees) (4). Recruits reported to Fort
Dix for 7 weeks of initial training through the basic train-
ing reception center, where they lived and were processed
into the Army during an intense 3 days of examinations,
administrative procedures, and indoctrination. At the
reception center, training unit cohorts were formed.
Recruits were grouped into 50-member units (platoons)
and organized into companies of 4 platoons each. Units
formed by week’s end moved from the reception center to
the basic training quarters. To prevent respiratory illnesses,
recruits were isolated in their company areas for 2 weeks
and restricted to the military post for 4 weeks (4). Platoon
members had close contact with other platoon members,
less contact with other platoons in their company, and even
less contact with other companies. 
On arrival, recruits received the 1975–1976 influenza
vaccine (A/Port Chalmers/1/73 [H3N2], A/Scotland/840/
74 [H3N2], and B/Hong Kong/15/72) (4). Other soldiers
reported directly to advanced training programs of 4 to 12
weeks at Fort Dix immediately after basic training at Fort
Dix or elsewhere. These soldiers received influenza vacci-
nations in basic training. Civilian employees and soldiers’
families were offered vaccine, but only an estimated <40%
accepted (4).
Training stopped over the Christmas–New Year’s holi-
days and resumed on January 5, 1976, with an influx of
new trainees. The weather was cold (wind chill factors of
0° to –43°F), and the reception center was crowded (4).
Resumption of training was associated with an explosive
febrile respiratory disease outbreak involving new arrivals
and others. Throat swabs were collected from a sample of
hospitalized soldiers with this syndrome. On January 23,
the Fort Dix preventive medicine physician learned of 2
isolations of adenovirus type 21 and suspected an aden-
ovirus outbreak (4). He notified the county health depart-
ment and the New Jersey (NJ) Department of Health of the
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official consulted with the military physician and suggest-
ed that the explosive, widespread outbreak could be
influenza (4). Over the next 2 days, 19 specimens were
delivered to the state laboratory and 7 A/Victoria-like
viruses and 3 unknown hemagglutinating agents were
identified (4). Specimens were flown to the Center for
Disease Control (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia, on February 6,
where a fourth unknown agent was found (4).
On February 2, Fort Dix and NJ Department of Health
personnel arranged for virologic studies of deaths possibly
caused by influenza (4). Tracheal swabs taken on February
5 from a recruit who died on February 4 yielded a fifth
unknown agent on February 9. By February 10, laboratory
evidence had confirmed that a novel influenza strain was
circulating at Fort Dix and that 2 different influenza strains
were causing disease. By February 13, all 5 unknown
strains were identified as swine influenza A (Hsw1N1).
The possibility of laboratory contamination was evaluated
(4). No known swine influenza A strains were present in
the NJ Department of Health Virus Laboratory before the
Fort Dix outbreak. Additionally, all unknown Fort Dix
viruses were independently isolated from original speci-
mens at CDC and the Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research (WRAIR), Washington, DC. Also, 2 patients
with novel virus isolates had convalescent-phase, homolo-
gous, hemagglutination-inhibition (HAI) antibody titers of
1:40–1:80, consistent with recent infections. The new
influenza strain had been independently identified in 3 dif-
ferent laboratories and supporting serologic evidence
developed within 15 days after the original specimens
were collected (Table) (4).
Swine Influenza A Viruses
The swine influenza A(Hsw1N1) viruses from Fort Dix
soldiers were studied at CDC (5,6). The novel virus was
named A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1). Initially, HAI sero-
logic studies of Fort Dix populations were performed at
WRAIR by using inactivated A/Mayo Clinic/103/74
(Hsw1N1) antigen from CDC (7). The A/Mayo Clinic
virus was recovered in 1974 from lung tissue obtained at
autopsy from a man with Hodgkin disease who lived on a
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Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1) antigen (7).
Outbreak Investigation Planning
Outbreak investigation plans were developed quickly,
and lines of communication and responsibilities were
defined. Since a retrospective investigation required exten-
sive serologic studies, a serology laboratory was estab-
lished at WRAIR and operated 7 days a week. The HAI
antibody test, which measured antibody to the hemagglu-
tinin glycoprotein, was used to identify infections (9).
Variables other than 1976 swine virus infection that might
influence HAI titers were identified. Influenza A (H1N1)
viruses circulated from 1918 to 1957 (3). Additionally, ear-
lier military influenza vaccines (1955–1969) and some
civilian formulations (1956–1958) contained swine anti-
gens (10). Most basic training soldiers were in their late
teens and early twenties, so few had potential exposure to
military vaccines (the earlier military vaccines were avail-
able to civilian workers and soldiers’ families) (10). Other
populations were expected to have age-related antibody
from infections or vaccines. Development of heterotypic
antibody after vaccination or infection with contemporary
H3N2 antigens was possible; populations suitable for
assessing this were studied. None of the potential HAI test
limitations was considered serious.
The NJ Department of Health continued to provide
virus isolation services to the military (4). Army personnel
investigated the outbreak on Fort Dix; civilian health
departments defined the outbreak beyond Fort Dix. CDC
provided reference laboratory support and consultation. 
Case Finding at Fort Dix
Case-finding was conducted prospectively and retro-
spectively (Table). Prospectively, throat washings were
collected from patients with febrile, acute respiratory dis-
ease who were hospitalized or sought treatment at the
emergency room February 14–16 (phase I, n = 50) and
February 22–24 (phase II, n = 45) (7). Attempts were made
to obtain paired serum specimens from phase I patients.
Specimens were obtained from 60 basic training soldiers,
13 other military personnel, and 22 civilians. A/Victoria/75
(H3N2) virus was isolated from 34 (68%) persons during
phase I and 21 (47%) in phase II (7). A/New Jersey/76
(Hsw1N1) was not isolated from any of the 95 patients.
One of 34 (3%) persons with an A/Victoria isolate and
paired serum samples had a >4-fold rise in titer to A/Mayo
Clinic (Hsw1N1) antigen, with an acute titer of <1:10
increasing to 1:20 (7). 
Retrospective study was made possible by an ongoing
Adenovirus Surveillance Program, which collected week-
ly throats swabs and paired serum specimens from a sam-
ple (≈3%–6%) of basic trainees hospitalized with
respiratory disease (7). Specimens had been sent to Army
regional laboratories, and 80% of the paired serum speci-
mens from Fort Dix trainees hospitalized between
November 1, 1975, and February 14, 1976, went to Fort
Meade, Maryland. Serum specimens not depleted by rou-
tine studies were stored. Stored serum specimens from 74
Fort Dix trainees were identified at Fort Meade and for-
warded to WRAIR; 39 (53%) of the trainees had been hos-
pitalized after January 1, 1976. These serum samples were
initially tested against A/Mayo Clinic antigen. Serum sam-
ples with >4-fold rises in titer were re-tested against
A/New Jersey and A/Victoria/3/75 (H3N2) antigens (7).
HAI titers to A/Mayo Clinic and A/New Jersey differed
only slightly. 
Concerns that influenza A (H3N2) infection or vacci-
nation might stimulate antibody to A/Mayo Clinic were
addressed. Four groups were studied to identify persons
with >4-fold heterotypic HAI antibody increases to
A/Mayo Clinic. None were found in 39 Fort Dix soldiers
who received influenza vaccine in February 1976
(group 1), and none were found among 27 hospitalized
soldiers from posts other than Fort Dix who had >4-fold
rises in complement fixation (CF) antibody to influenza A
(group 2) (7). In the third group, >4-fold rises in antibody
titers developed in 3 (8%) of 40 soldiers from Fort Dix
and elsewhere who had been hospitalized with an
A/Victoria isolate (7). In the fourth group, a single serum
sample was studied from each of 168 randomly selected
Fort Dix basic trainees who had received their annual
influenza vaccination 3 to 4 weeks earlier (11). Only 4
(2%) had HAI titers >1:20 to A/Mayo Clinic (11). In sim-
ilar studies by others, in 0%–6% of persons, heterotypic
antibody to influenza A/swine developed after infection
with A/Victoria (H3N2) or influenza vaccination (12,13).
Since heterotypic antibody to A/Mayo Clinic seldom
occurred, soldiers who were hospitalized for acute respira-
tory disease and showed a >4-fold titer rise to influenza A
(Hsw1N1) in stored serum specimens from the Adenovirus
Surveillance Program were considered to have had A/New
Jersey infections. Eight new cases in basic trainees were
found. Three (38%) of the 8 solders also had >4-fold anti-
body rises to A/Victoria. Therefore, 13 male, enlisted sol-
diers, aged 17–21 years, were identified as having had
respiratory diseases resulting in hospitalization or death
and an A/New Jersey (Hsw1N1) isolate or serologic con-
version to A/New Jersey (case-patients). Ten had arrived at
Fort Dix between January 5 and February 3, 1976. Three
arrived between September 9 and December 30, 1975.
Dates of onset of illness were known for 12 and were from
January 12 to February 8, 1976. Hospital admissions
occurred between January 19 and February 9. Autopsy
findings for the only patient who died showed severe
edema, hemorrhage, and mononuclear infiltrates in the
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ease or bacterial infection was found. Four (33%) of the 12
surviving patients had radiologic evidence of pneumonia
but their clinical syndromes were similar to those
described for patients with infections caused by other
influenza A strains (7).
Twelve of the 13 patients were basic trainees; one was
an office worker who had an A/New Jersey isolate (7). The
12 trainees were in 9 different training companies (7,14).
One company had 3 patients, and 1 company had 2
patients. In these 2 companies, all patients came from the
same platoon. Nine were interviewed. Except for those in
the same unit, the patients were unknown to each other. All
denied swine contact for 6 months before admission. No
common variables in working or living environments were
identified. All had contact with the Fort Dix medical care
system, but care took place in 5 clinics and 2 wards. From
January 19 to February 9, there were 7 days when none
occupied a hospital bed (7,14).
Transmission and Illness in Units 
with Case-patients
Transmission was assessed by using HAI antibody
titers to A/Mayo Clinic (Hsw1N1). Sixteen of 17 contacts
of the patient not in basic training, 18–43 years of age,
were studied, and 4 (25%) had titers >1:20 (14). One of the
9 training companies had a case-patient who completed
basic training before the case was identified and was not
studied. In another company with a case-patient, 13 sol-
diers were studied, and all had titers <1:10, but their pla-
toons were not identified. Seven companies were studied
by comparing the platoon with at least 1 case-patient to
other platoons in the company. Some members of all 7 pla-
toons with case-patients had titers >1:20, varying from 7%
to 56% (median = 26%). In other platoons from these
seven companies, the prevalence of titers >1:20 ranged
from 0% to 40% (median 18%), which indicated that
A/New Jersey virus transmission was not limited to 1 pla-
toon in most companies (14). 
Comparable samples of soldiers from the 7 companies
with cases discussed above and 7 contemporary companies
without cases were evaluated. Prevalences of HAI anti-
body titers to A/Mayo Clinic >1:20 in the companies with
cases ranged from 0% to 45% (median 18%) (8).
Prevalences in the companies without cases was 0%–10%
(median 4%) (14). 
Available records permitted the identification of hospi-
tal admissions for acute respiratory disease in 6 of the 9
companies with an A/New Jersey case. From January 19 to
February 9, 1976, when the A/New Jersey patients from
these companies were admitted, admission rates for acute
respiratory disease of >3.0 per 100 men per week were
observed in 4 of the companies. The highest rates occurred
during the week ending January 25 and ranged from 1.1 to
6.9 (median 3.4) per 100 men per week (14).
Extent of Spread and Duration of Outbreak
The weekly formation of segregated cohorts of new
recruits provided an opportunity to study the extent and
duration of virus transmission. A random 9% sample of
soldiers beginning basic training from January 5 to March
1 were studied for HAI antibody to A/Mayo Clinic
(Hsw1N1) (11). The prevalence of titers >1:20 by weekly
cohort ranged from 0% to 19%. The 3 highest prevalences,
19%, 12%, and 9%, occurred in cohorts who started train-
ing on January 12, 19, and 26, respectively. Prevalences
for 6 other cohorts ranged from 0% to 5%, with 0% preva-
lence in the cohorts that started training on January 5 and
March 1 (11). Eleven of the 12 Fort Dix basic training sol-
diers identified as A/New Jersey case-patients also began
training on January 12, 19, and 26 (11,14). 
From February 21 to February 27, a total of 39 soldiers
in the basic training reception center were studied for HAI
antibody to A/New Jersey (Table) (11). This same group
was studied 5 weeks later. All 39 had HAI antibody titers
to A/Mayo Clinic <1:10 initially and at 5 weeks. The
prevalence of HAI antibody titers to A/Mayo Clinic anti-
gen was also determined in advanced training students,
civilians who visited the Fort Dix Phlebotomy Clinic,
installation maintenance workers, basic training instruc-
tors, military medical and veterinary personnel, and sol-
diers who worked in the reception center. In advanced
training students and persons <25 years of age, the preva-
lence of titers >1:20 was 0%–6%, consistent with het-
erotypic responses. However, titers were higher in persons
>26 years old; most had prevalences in the range of 17%
to 44%, but women and men >51 years of age at the
Phlebotomy Clinic had prevalences of 92% (n = 37) and
88% (n = 60), respectively (11). 
The earliest A/New Jersey patient was hospitalized on
January 19; the last identified patient was admitted on
February 9 (Table) (7). Both were identified by serologic
testing. Four of 5 patients with virus isolates were admit-
ted on January 29 and 30. The last A/New Jersey isolate
came from the soldier who died on February 4. The patient
admitted on January 19 reported that his onset of illness
occurred on January 12. Since no evidence was found for
A/New Jersey virus at Fort Dix before January 12, the
virus was likely introduced on or shortly after resumption
of training on January 5. As shown by the clustering of
hospital admissions, the A/New Jersey outbreak peaked
during late January and tapered off in early February. The
absence of any indication of the A/New Jersey virus in the
cohort beginning basic training on March 1 and in the
reception center group who gave blood samples from
February 21 to February 27 and 5 weeks later supports the
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(Table) (11).
To understand the relationship of the A/Victoria and
A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1) outbreaks, serum specimens
from the 9% sample of soldiers who began basic training
from January 5 to March 1 were also studied for HAI anti-
body to A/Victoria. The geometric mean titers to
A/Victoria >1:10 for cohorts beginning training on January
5 and January 12 were 1:56 and 1:53, respectively. The
geometric mean titers then increased to 1:114 in the cohort
that started on February 2, peaked at 1:120 in the cohort
that began on February 9, remained high at 1:109 for the
February 16 cohort, and then returned to baseline (11).
Thus, the A/New Jersey outbreak likely started in early
January and peaked in late January, followed closely by
the A/Victoria outbreak.
Even though A/Mayo Clinic titers >1:20 were seen in
Fort Dix populations other than basic trainees, the preva-
lences in young people were very low, consistent with het-
erotypic antibody. Higher prevalences in older persons
could have been related to earlier influenza A (H1N1)
infections or vaccinations with vaccines that contained
swine influenza antigens (10). The high titers to A/Mayo
Clinic in these groups could not be related to illness, vac-
cination, or swine contact (11). When the serologic data
were extrapolated, the total number of A/New Jersey infec-
tions in Fort Dix basic trainees was ≈230 when contacts of
all 13 case-patients were considered and ≈142 when only
virologically confirmed cases were considered true cases
(11,15).
Case Finding beyond Fort Dix
Influenza A/Victoria-like strains had been identified in
New Jersey as early as January 21, 1976. By the end of
January, the state had investigated reports of high employ-
ee and student absenteeism and a hospital outbreak.
Patients in all episodes were sampled by using virus isola-
tion and serologic testing. All laboratory reports indicated
A/Victoria virus infections (4). 
Starting February 10, arrangements were made to study
febrile respiratory disease patients at McGuire Air Force
Base (adjoining Fort Dix) and at hospitals, emergency
rooms, and physicians’ offices in the Fort Dix vicinity.
Medical examiners were told to obtain specimens from
possible influenza patients and surveillance was increased
statewide. From January 9 to March 19, infection with
influenza A/Victoria virus was documented in 301 persons
by virus isolation (151 persons), CF or HAI serology (113
persons), or both (37 persons). Cases in New Jersey came
from 19 of 21 counties, McGuire Air Force Base, and
Lakehurst Naval Training Center. Delaware had 19 cases,
including 5 from Dover Air Force Base. From January 31
to March 17, 10 civilian deaths in New Jersey were attrib-
uted to influenza. Influenza A/Victoria (H3N2) was isolat-
ed from all 10 patients (4). 
The numbers of isolation and serologic specimens test-
ed and the percentages positive for A/Victoria were consis-
tent with an outbreak that began quickly in January and
declined in late February to early March. No influenza
cases were identified after March 19; influenza A/New
Jersey was never isolated outside Fort Dix (Table) (4,7).
Among patients with serologic evidence of influenza,
HAI antibody responses to both A/Victoria and A/New
Jersey were studied in 134. Six (4%), aged 22 to 71 years,
had >4-fold HAI rises in titer to both viruses (4). In the
absence of any association with swine influenza A virus,
the A/New Jersey titers were attributed to A/Victoria infec-
tions.  
Summary and Speculation
A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1) was likely introduced into
Fort Dix early in 1976, after the holidays (15). The virus
caused disease with radiologic evidence of pneumonia in
at least 4 soldiers and 1 death; all of these patients had pre-
viously been healthy (7,15). The virus was transmitted to
close contacts in the unique basic training environment,
with limited transmission outside the basic training group.
A/New Jersey probably circulated for a month and disap-
peared. The source of the virus, the exact time of its intro-
duction into Fort Dix, and factors limiting its spread and
duration are unknown (15). 
The Fort Dix outbreak may have been a zoonotic anom-
aly caused by introduction of an animal virus into a
stressed population in close contact in crowded facilities
during a cold winter. However, the impact of A/New
Jersey virus on this healthy young population was severe
in terms of estimated infections, hospitalizations, and
duration of the outbreak.
If the outbreak was more than an anomaly, why did it
not extend beyond basic trainees? Several factors merit
consideration. Contact between basic trainees and others
was limited. Moreover, a swine influenza antigen was
included in annual military influenza vaccine formulations
from 1955 through 1969 (10). The high antibody titers to
A/Mayo Clinic antigen observed with increasing age in the
Phlebotomy Clinic population may reflect earlier influen-
za A(H1N1) infections or vaccine exposure and some pro-
tection (11). Also, competition between A/New Jersey and
A/Victoria viruses must be considered. The A/Victoria
virus spread widely and may have limited the impact of
A/New Jersey virus with its lesser ability for human trans-
mission. 
Could the Fort Dix outbreak have resulted from interac-
tion between swine influenza A and A/Victoria viruses?
A/Victoria transmission occurred in New Jersey before
A/New Jersey was identified at Fort Dix. Is it possible that
Swine Influenza A Outbreak, Fort Dix, NJ, 1976
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006 27A/Victoria virus and an early A/New Jersey virus coinfect-
ed a soldier with genetic exchange, resulting in a recombi-
nant virus with enhanced human transmission capability?
The rapid disappearance of A/New Jersey prohibited stud-
ies of virus interactions. Genetic analyses of A/New Jersey,
A/Victoria and contemporary A/swine viruses might eluci-
date a relationship. 
Communication and collaboration existed at the onset
of the outbreak and continued throughout the investiga-
tion. The points of contact at the NJ Department of Health,
Fort Dix, CDC, and WRAIR had been established before
the outbreak, so time was not lost identifying organizations
and persons who needed to be contacted. Organizational
roles were defined early and respected. The development
of outbreak investigation plans, collaboration in field and
laboratory work, and exchange of information occurred
smoothly. An important part of the Army investigation was
establishment of points of contact at WRAIR who commu-
nicated with military leaders, the NJ Department of Health,
CDC, and the press. Military epidemiology and laboratory
teams reported to WRAIR points of contact. This system
protected these teams from disruptive inquiries.
The burden on the laboratories supporting this investi-
gation was intense, lasting for weeks. In 1976, WRAIR
was a research and field epidemiology laboratory that also
operated as a public health reference laboratory. The
WRAIR commander had the authority to reallocate and
mobilize scientists and laboratory resources. Today,
WRAIR no longer functions as a public health laboratory.
The depth of resources and flexibility that existed at
WRAIR in 1976 cannot be found in other military labora-
tories (16). Duplicating the 1976 laboratory effort today, in
timely fashion, would be difficult. 
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